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International Law: The Compatibility of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral
Immunity Agreements Included in the American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act
I. Introduction
On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
entered into force, establishing the world’s first permanent international
criminal tribunal.1 Although other ad hoc international criminal tribunals have
been established in the past,2 these tribunals were never intended to become
permanent fixtures in the international legal system. Instead, the ad hoc
tribunals were temporary entities that were created to deal with issues arising
from a specific conflict. Once the crimes committed during a conflict had been
prosecuted, the tribunals were no longer necessary. The Rome Statute
improved ad hoc tribunals by creating a permanent criminal tribunal with global
scope. The new criminal tribunal is an international criminal court that, rather
than being limited to cases from a specific geographic area, can hear issues
arising from any country or conflict in the world.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) did not, however, have unlimited
international support. Of the sixty-six countries that had ratified the Rome
Statute by the time it entered into force,3 the United States was conspicuously
absent.4 This absence was not surprising, however, given that the United States
had expressed a number of concerns about the ICC throughout the meetings and
conferences leading up to the drafting and adoption of the Rome Statute.5 In an
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Examples of ad hoc tribunals include the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia.
3. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 126 (providing for the entry into force of the
Rome Statute “on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit
of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations”); see also Coalition for the International Criminal Court, A
Timeline of the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, at
http://iccnow.org/documents/iccbasics/ History.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter ICC
Timeline] (noting that on April 11, 2002, the sixtieth ratification instrument was deposited at
a special ceremony at U.N. headquarters when ten countries — Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, Jordan, Mongolia, Niger,
Romania, and Slovakia — simultaneously submitted their instruments of ratification).
4. Although President Clinton added the signature of the United States to the Rome
Statute on December 31, 2000, the Bush Administration later withdrew the U.S. signature.
See infra Part II.B; notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Joel F. England, The Response of the United States to the International
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early display of opposition to the ICC, for example, the United States was one
of only seven states, including China, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, that voted against
the adoption of the Rome Statute at the 1998 United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome.6
Since entering into force in July 2002, the Rome Statute has continued to
gather support from other countries around the world. As of February 2005,
there were 139 signatories and 97 parties to the Rome Statute.7
Notwithstanding this display of worldwide support, the United States has
consistently remained opposed to the Rome Statute. In May 2002, the United
States notified the U.N. that it would not become a party to the treaty,8 despite
the fact that President William Jefferson Clinton had previously authorized the
U.S. signature.9 In the months following this notification, U.S. opposition to the
ICC continued to intensify.
Criminal Court: Rejection, Ratification or Something Else?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 941,
944-50 (2001) (discussing common U.S. objections to the Rome Statute); Jimmy Gurule,
United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal
Court: Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?,
35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (2001) (providing a detailed description of U.S. objections to the
jurisdiction of the ICC); David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal
Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 68-76 (2001) (discussing U.S. concerns in the negotiations
surrounding the Rome Statute and addressing how flaws in the Rome Statute were treated
following the Rome Conference); John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court:
An Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 85 (2000)
(describing U.S. objections to the ICC, including concerns over the jurisdiction of the court and
the vulnerability of U.S. military personnel to politically motivated prosecutions).
6. Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A
Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 21 (2003).
7. Council for the International Criminal Court, State Signatures and Ratifications Chart,
at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2005).
8. Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan from Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
In t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , J o h n R . B o l t o n ( M a y 6 , 2 0 0 2 ) , a t
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm [hereinafter Bolton Letter].
9. President’s Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, 37
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC., Dec. 31, 2000, ¶ 4 [hereinafter President’s Statement on the
Rome Treaty]. In his statement, President Clinton noted:
XXIn signing, however, we are not abandoning our concerns about significant
flaws in the treaty . . . . With signature, however, we will be in a position to
influence the evolution of the court. Without signature, we will not . . . . Given
these concerns [of politicized prosecutions and the exercise of jurisdiction over
personnel of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute], I will not, and do not
recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and
consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.
Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.
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One significant act of opposition to the ICC occurred on August 2, 2002,
when Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act
(ASPA),10 a piece of legislation that sparked a great deal of criticism from ICC
supporters.11 Among the more controversial provisions of ASPA is section
2007, which prohibits the United States from providing military assistance to
a state party to the ICC unless the state either has signed an Article 98 waiver,
also known as a “bilateral immunity agreement” (BIA), with the United States
or another exception to the prohibition on military assistance applies.12
The BIA exception has proved to be the most contentious aspect of ASPA.
In August 2002, the United States began actively seeking these agreements with
both parties and nonparties to the Rome Statute.13 As of December 2004, the
United States had signed BIAs with over ninety countries.14 The United States
claims that Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which recognizes that a state
party may have other international treaty obligations that ICC jurisdiction
should not disturb, contemplates these BIAs.15 The strongest critics of the BIAs
contend that the United States is either seeking to place its personnel beyond the
jurisdiction of international law or attempting to undermine the ICC
altogether.16 These critics argue that the BIAs violate the Rome Statute and
10. 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat. 820,
899-909 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7432 (2004)) [hereinafter ASPA]. ASPA was passed
as Title II of this legislation.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2007; see also infra Part II.E (providing additional
information about BIAs).
13. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: U.S. Bilateral Agreements Relating to ICC, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 200, 201
(2003); see also Lilian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS . 537, 547 (2003) (noting that the ASPA gives the United States more
negotiating power in persuading other countries to sign a BIA); News Release, Human Rights
W a t c h , B i l a t e r a l Im m u n i t y A g r e e m e n t s ( J u n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) , a t
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateral agreements.pdf (accusing the Bush
administration of launching a “worldwide campaign to negotiate bilateral immunity
agreements that would exempt U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction”).
14. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Status of U.S. Bilateral Immunity
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
a
t
http://iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/BIAsByRegion_current. pdf (last
modified Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter ICC, Status of BIAs].
15. See U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: The International Criminal Court (Aug. 2,
2002), at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/23426.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet: ICC]
(asserting that the Rome Statute provides for BIAs in Article 98 and expressing the intention
to pursue these agreements worldwide).
16. See, e.g., Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: US Efforts to Obtain
Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, IOR 40/025/2002 (Sept.
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that the United States is acting inappropriately in its pursuit of these
agreements.17
This comment examines the controversy surrounding the BIAs and argues
that even though the United States may contend that the Rome Statute
contemplates BIAs, they are nevertheless contrary to the purpose of the statute
and are incompatible with U.S. policy interests in the international arena. Part
II of this comment initially provides a background of the events leading up to
the dispute over the legality of BIAs. This background includes a brief history
of the ICC in addition to the history and circumstances surrounding the drafting
and adoption of Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. Next, Part II discusses
President Clinton’s signing of the Rome Statute and the later withdrawal of the
U.S. signature by the Bush administration. After introducing some of the
primary areas of dispute in the Article 98(2) negotiations, Part II then focuses
on ASPA and its more controversial provisions. Finally, Part II explains the
relationship between ASPA and the BIAs and provides a detailed description of
the characteristics of a BIA.
In Part III, this comment introduces the general principles of treaty
interpretation as established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).18 An understanding of treaty interpretation is necessary for insight
into the issue of whether adherence to a BIA could cause a country to violate
its obligations under the Rome Statute or whether, as the United States
contends, the exceptions to ICC jurisdiction set forth in Article 98(2)
contemplate BIAs.
To demonstrate a practical application of the issues involved in the dispute
over the BIAs, Part IV presents a hypothetical conflict between the United
States and the ICC. This conflict could arise in a situation in which the ICC
seeks jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen held by State X, a state that is a party to
the ICC but has also signed a BIA with the United States. After discussing the
relevant provisions in the Rome Statute and the mechanisms involved in the
resolution of the conflict, Part IV further examines some of the primary
concepts contained in Article 98(2) and in the BIAs in light of the principles of
2, 2002), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engIOR400252002?Open&of=eng-385
[hereinafter Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts] (arguing that the agreements violate the
Rome Statute and urging countries not to enter into these agreements with the United States);
Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court:
Legal
Anal ys i s
of
Impunity
Agr eement s ,
at
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005)
(contending that the agreements “violate the Rome Statute and should be opposed”).
17. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
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treaty interpretation discussed in Part III. This examination supports the
conclusion that in the case of such a conflict, a state that attempts to follow its
obligations to the United States under a BIA could simultaneously violate its
duties to the ICC under the Rome Statute.
Finally, Part V examines the international consequences of the U.S.
campaign to secure BIAs under ASPA and recommends a course of action for
the Bush administration to pursue to strengthen both U.S. interests and
international opinion of the United States.
II. Background Information
A. The Formation of the ICC
The concept of an international criminal tribunal is at least as old as the postWorld War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.19 During World War II, the world
witnessed such atrocities that nations began to seek the formation of an
international tribunal to punish those responsible and deter similar horrors from
occurring in the future.20 The push for an international criminal tribunal,
however, decreased during the Cold War, which proved to be a significant
political conflict that kept the international community “from building on the
Nuremberg experience.”21 The world would have to wait until the end of the
Cold War before an international criminal tribunal would once again become
a relevant topic in international discussions.
More recently, the experience of establishing war crimes tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has been instrumental in solidifying the desire
for a permanent international criminal court.22 Before the suspected war
criminals could be investigated or prosecuted, the international community had
to address the challenges of establishing the courts that would hear the cases
arising from the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Some of the
difficulties involved in setting up the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals included
“negotiating the tribunal’s statute, its headquarters agreements, and
appropriating its funds.”23 In the absence of a permanent alternative, the
international community will continue to face these difficulties when
circumstances require an international criminal tribunal.
A permanent international criminal tribunal would alleviate some of the
difficulties faced by those responsible for establishing the ad hoc tribunals.
Ambassador David Scheffer, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

England, supra note 5, at 942.
Id.
Id.
Scheffer, supra note 5, at 50.
Seguin, supra note 5, at 86.
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Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International
Criminal Court, remarked before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
that the experience with the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
has “convinced us of the merit of creating a permanent court that could be more
quickly available for investigations and prosecutions and more cost efficient in
its operation.”24 Scheffer’s remarks reflected the view of ICC supporters that
establishing a permanent international criminal tribunal would ultimately lead
to greater efficiency in administering international justice.
Although the desire for administrative efficiency was an important
consideration for those in favor of establishing an international criminal
tribunal, a more fundamental concern was the assurance that war criminals
would not go unpunished.25 This concern is reflected in the Preamble to the
Rome Statute, which acknowledges the determination “to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes.”26 ICC supporters resolved not to witness another
war criminal going unpunished for atrocities simply because a domestic legal
system was either unable or unwilling to try the case and provide the
appropriate punishment.27 A permanent international criminal tribunal would
ensure that an individual suspected of war crimes would be required to face a
trial in either a domestic or international legal system.28
The unwillingness or inability of a domestic legal system to take action
against suspected war criminals is often closely related to the political or
military position of the suspect.29 Suspects in positions of power are sometimes
better able to shield themselves from prosecution through mechanisms that
provide some type of immunity for leaders.30 In the absence of any international
criminal tribunal, such a suspect who escapes domestic prosecution could likely
escape all prosecution. Scheffer has noted that this “gap in the international
system” that allows an individual in a leadership position to enjoy impunity can
no longer be tolerated.31 According to Scheffer, “The notion that political
imperatives immunize any individual from criminal law with respect to the
worst possible crimes directed against humankind is quickly losing credibility,
24. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 11
(1998) (testimony of David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes) [hereinafter
National Interest Hearings].
25. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 51.
26. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
27. See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 51.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 52.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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and no democratic government . . . could champion such impunity and remain
true to the fundamental governing principles of a modern civilized society.”32
The ICC has attempted to fill this gap in the international system of criminal
prosecution by ensuring that individuals in leadership positions will not enjoy
impunity for their actions.33 The Rome Statute addresses this issue in Article
27, which notes that the Rome Statute “shall apply equally to all persons
without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official
capacity . . . shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under
this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.”34
With these concerns in mind, negotiations on the formation of the Rome
Statute began at the U.N. in 1995.35 The Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court met twice that year to debate
a draft statute proposed by the International Law Society. At the end of 1995,
the U.N. General Assembly created a Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft
of a statute to submit at an international conference.36 The Preparatory
Committee met twice in 1996, three times in 1997, and held its final meetings
in March and April of 1998, where the Committee finalized a draft of the Rome
Statute.37 On July 17, 1998, the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Rome
adopted the Rome Statute amid a great deal of celebration.38 Nevertheless, the
international community’s goal of an international criminal tribunal was not
easily fulfilled. By the end of the process, 160 states, 33 intergovernmental
organizations, and a coalition of 236 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

32. Id. at 52-53.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 27, at 1017.
35. ICC Timeline, supra note 3. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the
Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 443 (1999) (providing a detailed description of the negotiations at the 1998 Rome
Conference).
36. ICC Timeline, supra note 3.
37. Id.
38. After the final vote:
XX[T]he delegates burst into a spontaneous standing ovation, which turned into
rhythmic applause that lasted close to ten minutes. Some delegates embraced
one another, and others had tears in their eyes. It was one of the most
extraordinary emotional scenes ever to take place at a diplomatic conference.
The prevailing feeling was that the long journey that had started after World War
I had finally reached its destination. This historic moment was of great
significance for everyone who had struggled to establish the ICC.
Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 459.
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had participated in the conference that eventually culminated in the Rome
Statute.39
B. Signing and “Unsigning” the Rome Statute
President Clinton authorized the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute on
December 31, 2000, the last possible day for signing. 40 President Clinton’s
support for the ICC, however, was not unqualified. He expressed concern over
the potential reach of the ICC’s jurisdiction and the risk of politically motivated
prosecutions against U.S. personnel.41 He also indicated that he would not
submit the Rome Statute to the Senate, recommending instead that his successor
likewise refrain from doing so until the drafting committee had addressed U.S.
concerns.42
After President George Walker Bush assumed office in January 2001, he and
his advisors indicated that they were opposed to the United States becoming a
party to the Rome Statute.43 Nevertheless, the Bush administration did not
make its first significant move to oppose the ICC until the following year. In
May 2002, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
stating that “the United States does not intend to become a party to the [Rome
Statute]. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from
its signature on December 31, 2000.”44
Bolton’s letter marked the Bush administration’s attempt to “unsign” the
Rome Statute.45 Although the Bush administration clearly intended to nullify
any legal obligations that arose from President Clinton’s act of signing the
Rome Statute, the legal significance of this letter remains unclear.46 When
President Clinton signed the Rome Statute, the United States became a
signatory to this treaty. 47 Even though the Rome Statute had not yet entered
39. ICC Timeline, supra note 3.
40. President’s Statement on the Rome Treaty, supra note 9, ¶ 1.
41. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.
42. Id.
43. Jean Galbraith, Between Empire and Community: The United States and
Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment: The Bush Administration’s Response
to the International Criminal Court, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 683, 686 (2003).
44. Bolton Letter, supra note 8; see also Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV.
2061 (2003) (describing the possible legal significance of the U.S. attempt to withdraw from
the Rome Statute).
45. See generally Swaine, supra note 44 (providing a detailed legal analysis of the act of
“unsigning” a treaty before becoming a party).
46. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal
Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
47. See Swaine, supra note 44, at 2066-71 (discussing the relationship between signing
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into force, the United States still had certain obligations that arose from its
signature.48 Article 18 of the VCLT addresses the obligations of a state that has
signed a treaty that has not yet entered into force or has not yet been ratified by
that state.49 Article 18 reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become
a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending
the entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into
force is not unduly delayed.50
The obligations that arise after a state signs a treaty are known as interim
obligations.51 One commentator has pointed out that “[i]f signatories are
encumbered by duties that meaningfully approximate those imposed on parties,
their incentives to defect from ratification — that is, to seek out or to maintain
status as a mere signatory — may be diminished.”52
Even though the United States is not a party to the VCLT, the VCLT is still
binding on nonparties as a reflection of customary international law.53 In the
Bolton letter, the United States alluded to the VCLT’s notion of interim
obligations by stating that “no legal obligations” resulted from President

a treaty and ratifying a treaty).
48. VCLT, supra note 18, art. 18.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Swaine, supra note 44, at 2071.
52. Id. at 2077-78.
53. Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 286 (1988). Frankowska explains:
The United States, although a signatory, is not a party to the [VCLT] . . . . But
according to a widespread opinio juris, legal conviction of the international
community, the [VCLT] represents a treaty which to a large degree is a
restatement of customary rules, binding States regardless of whether they are
parties to the [VCLT]. Even before the [VCLT] entered into force, its provisions
had been invoked by States and by the International Court of Justice. The
Department of State has on a number of occasions acknowledged that it regards
particular articles of the [VCLT] as codifying the existing law. Also, the
American Law Institute . . . took the [VCLT] as its “black letter” for setting out
principles relating to the law of treaties.
Id.
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Clinton’s signature.54 While international lawyers still debate the legal
consequences of unsigning, one commentator has indicated that this response
to international treaties may become more prevalent:
If little is asked of mere signatories, the risk that unsigning will
become endemic is low. But with the continued popularity of
multilateral conventions, and the proliferation of parties actively
engaged in making and enforcing international law, it is becoming
steadily less likely that states will be able to maintain any kind of
collective repose. Under these circumstances, unsigning may well
become more common, and in the process threaten the possibilities
for international cooperation.55
While the possibility of unsigning might be contrary to the spirit of
international cooperation, it has nevertheless been recognized as “a legitimate
and understandable course of action under the [VCLT].”56 Supporters of the
U.S. position echoed this view and noted that the Bolton letter appeared
consistent with international law.57 According to international law, a treaty
signatory is not obligated to become a party to the treaty.58 This principle is
reflected in Article 125 of the Rome Statute, which states that the Statute is
“subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States.”59 This
provision indicates that the drafters contemplated a situation in which a state
that had signed the Rome Statute did not thereafter ratify it. The VCLT also
contemplates a situation in which a signatory makes “its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty.”60
Although supporters contended that the U.S. attempt to unsign the Rome
Statute was consistent with both the VCLT and the Statute itself, the Bolton
letter sparked considerable international criticism and disapproval.61 Those
ICC supporters that had hoped for full U.S. participation in the ICC recognized
that the letter was a significant setback to their position.62 More significantly,
“[i]nternational lawyers . . . regarded the mere act of unsigning as significant
in itself.”63 Opponents of the letter argued that the U.S. withdrawal of its
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Bolton Letter, supra note 8.
Swaine, supra note 44, at 2089.
Id.
Bradley, supra note 46.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 125.
VCLT, supra note 18, art. 18.
Swaine, supra note 44, at 2062.
Id.
Id. at 2063.
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signature was unprecedented.64 Some expressed fear that the United States’
move would signal to other countries that it was acceptable to withdraw from
a treaty after signing but before ratifying it.65
The legal status of the U.S. attempt to unsign the Rome Statute has
significant implications for the controversy surrounding the BIAs. If the Bolton
letter is recognized as an effective withdrawal of the U.S. signature, then
customary international law as expressed in Article 18 of the VCLT would no
longer obligate the United States to “refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty.”66 If the Bush administration’s attempt to
unsign the Rome Statute is not internationally recognized, then the United
States, as a signatory, would still be under the obligations imposed on a
signatory by customary international law.
C. U.S. Concerns About the Scope of the ICC’s Jurisdiction and Article
98(2) Negotiations
Despite its opposition to certain aspects of an international criminal tribunal,
the United States actively participated in the drafting and negotiation of the
Rome Statute. From the beginning of the negotiations, the U.S. delegation
voiced a number of concerns that it wanted the drafters to address before it
would offer its full support to the new international criminal tribunal.67
One of the primary U.S. concerns involved the scope of the ICC’s
jurisdiction. The provisions dealing with the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction
are set forth in Articles 12-20 of the Rome Statute.68 According to Article 13,
the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a crime listed in the Rome Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party
in accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to
have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of
such a crime in accordance with article 15.69
64. Id. at 2064.
65. Id.
66. VCLT, supra note 18, art. 18.
67. See Scheffer, supra note 5, at 54 n.22 (citing several speeches made by Scheffer
addressing U.S. concerns about ICC jurisdiction, explaining flaws in the Rome Statute, and
providing reasons why the United States did not sign an earlier draft of the treaty).
68. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12-20.
69. Id. art. 13. Applicable crimes are listed in Article 5.
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Article 12 of the Rome Statute outlines three preconditions in which the ICC
may exercise jurisdiction.70 Once any one of these Article 12 preconditions is
met, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Article 13.71 First,
according to Article 12(1), a state that is a party to the Rome Statute accepts
ICC jurisdiction.72 Second, Article 12(3) explains that a state that is not a party
to the Rome Statute can consent to ICC jurisdiction with respect to a particular
crime.73 Third, according to Article 12(2), in cases that are not referred to the
ICC by the Security Council,
the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with [12(3)]:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or
aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.74
Under this third precondition, if the conduct in question occurs in the territory
of a state party to the Rome Statute, then the ICC will have jurisdiction over the
suspect regardless of whether the suspect’s home state is a party to the Rome
Statute.75
The scope of jurisdiction expressed in Articles 12 and 13 could thus include
U.S. military personnel even though the United States chose not to become a
party to the Rome Statute.76 This possibility was an important concern of the
United States during the drafting and negotiation of the Rome Statute.77
Specifically, the United States expressed concerns about “the risk that the [ICC]
may seek to investigate, obtain custody of, and ultimately prosecute a U.S.
service member or U.S. Government official in connection with that individual’s
official duty.”78
Although one of the main purposes of the ICC is to ensure that potential
suspects do not enjoy impunity, this goal does not require the ICC to carry out
70. Id. art. 12.
71. Id. art. 13(b). These preconditions are not necessary if an ICC prosecutor has referred
the matter to the ICC. For any other case, these preconditions must be met.
72. Id. art. 12(1).
73. Id. art. 12(3).
74. Id. art. 12(2).
75. Id. art. 12.
76. Id.
77. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 64-65.
78. Id. at 87.
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the prosecution itself.79 If the domestic judicial system of the suspect is able to
investigate and prosecute the alleged crime, then the ICC does not need to
exercise its jurisdiction over the case. The United States was concerned about
a situation in which the ICC would assert jurisdiction over U.S. personnel even
though the United States was both willing and able to investigate the case.80
Specifically, the United States objected to the possibility of politically motivated
ICC prosecutions of U.S. personnel involved in an internationally unpopular
military or humanitarian mission.81 This fear of politically motivated ICC
prosecutions was especially relevant given the scope and frequency of U.S.
participation in international peacekeeping missions, as well as military actions
taken by the United States and its allies.
As a partial solution to this concern, the United States demanded that the
Rome Statute include a strong principle of complementarity, which “requires
that the ICC defer to national legal systems that are willing and able to
investigate and, if merited, prosecute perpetrators over which they have
jurisdiction.”82 The importance of this principle is also reflected in the Preamble
to the Rome Statute, which states “that the International Criminal Court
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”83 Scheffer considered the inclusion of “[a] strong regime of
complementarity” to be one of the major U.S. objectives achieved during the
Rome Statute negotiations.84
U.S. concerns about the jurisdiction of the ICC were most evident in
negotiations over Article 98(2) to the Rome Statute and the accompanying
procedural rules.85 Article 98, entitled “Cooperation with respect to waiver of
immunity and consent to surrender,” contemplates two situations in which a
request for cooperation by the ICC may conflict with a state’s obligations under
international law.86 First, under Article 98(1), the ICC may not proceed with
a request for cooperation or surrender of an individual if that request will
conflict with the state’s obligations to honor the diplomatic immunity of that
79. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17-19 (establishing the criteria for admissibility and
providing guidelines for challenging either the jurisdiction of the ICC or the admissibility of
a case).
80. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, Frequently Asked Questions about the U.S.
Government’s Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court (ICC) (July 30, 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/23428.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Regarding the
ICC].
81. Id.
82. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 88.
83. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
84. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 73.
85. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
86. Id. art. 98.
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individual.87 Article 98(2), which contains the second situation, is the starting
point for the present controversy surrounding the BIAs mentioned in ASPA.
Article 98(2) reads:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the
consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.88
The drafters of the Rome Statute included this provision in Article 98(2) to
address the relationship between a state party’s obligations to the ICC and any
obligations it might have to states under other treaty agreements, such as
extradition treaties or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).89
A SOFA is “a treaty governing the legal status of members of armed forces
of one state (the sending state) stationed in another state (the receiving state)
pursuant to that agreement.”90 These agreements also explain “which state has
the primary duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient admissible evidence,
prosecute members of armed forces from the sending state who were suspected
of committing crimes on the territory of the receiving state.”91 The drafters of
the Rome Statute recognized that many states already had such agreements in
place and did not want the Rome Statute to conflict with these agreements.92
Much of the debate over the compatibility of U.S. BIAs with the Rome
Statute focuses on the “international agreements” contemplated by Article
98(2).93 The United States contends that the BIAs are included in the
“international agreements” mentioned in Article 98(2).94 Scheffer himself noted
this possibility in a discussion of safeguards from ICC jurisdiction available to
the United States, observing:
The United States can negotiate bilateral or multilateral agreements
to protect any American citizen from surrender to the ICC. The
United States can leverage the approval of such international
agreements with particular countries as a precondition to wide87. Id. art. 98(1).
88. Id. art. 98(2).
89. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Chimene Keitner, Crafting the International Criminal Court: Trials and
Tribulations in Article 98(2), 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 215, 232-35 (2001).
93. See Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
94. Id.
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ranging U.S. cooperation with the Court during its non-State Party
status and ultimately to U.S. ratification of the ICC Treaty.95
The U.S. State Department also noted and has continued to emphasize that the
BIAs were provided for in Article 98.96 Furthermore, the State Department has
explicitly recognized the broader scope of the BIAs and distinguished them from
preexisting SOFAs.97 A recent publication from the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs reflects this distinction, stating, “The Article 98 agreements we
are seeking are not limited to protecting U.S. military and civilian employees of
the Department of Defense and their dependents, as most SOFAs are, but will
protect all [U.S.] nationals.”98 The United States clearly does not agree with
those who contend that the “international agreements” contemplated by Article
98(2) are limited to existing SOFAs.99 To the contrary, U.S. efforts to pursue
BIAs depend on an interpretation of Article 98(2) that is not limited to existing
SOFAs.
In addition to advocating that the BIAs are included in the “international
agreements” mentioned in Article 98(2), the United States also sought to include
a procedural rule to further explain the scope and operation of Article 98.100
This rule, included as Rule 195 in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the
ICC, states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for the surrender of a
person without the consent of a sending State if, under article 98,
paragraph 2, such a request would be inconsistent with obligations
under an international agreement pursuant to which the consent of
a sending State is required prior to the surrender of a person of that
State to the Court.101
Scheffer recognized that Rule 195 would be in the best interest of the United
States, noting that it would “[leave] open the possibility of negotiation of an
95. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 90 (internal citation omitted).
96. Fact Sheet: ICC, supra note 15.
97. Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Regarding the ICC, supra note 80 (“Article 98 solely concerns
the surrender of individuals to the ICC. SOFAs govern the status of forces in a particular
country. While criminal jurisdiction issues within the context of the host nation’s laws are
dealt with in SOFAs, there is no inherent conflict in signing an Article 98 agreement.”).
98. Id.
99. Opponents to the U.S. position contend that Article 98(2) only applies to agreements
in existence at the time a state party signed the Rome Statute. See Amnesty International, U.S.
Efforts, supra note 16 (arguing that “the wording of Article 98(2) does not suggest that it
covers new agreements”). Part IV of this comment will more closely examine these conflicting
interpretations.
100. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 90.
101. INT’L CRIM. CT. R. 195.
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international agreement between the ICC and the United States to protect any
American citizen from surrender to the ICC.”102
D. ASPA and the U.S. Response to the Rome Statute
On August 2, 2002, Congress passed ASPA, which prohibits the United
States from providing military assistance to any state party to the ICC that has
not signed a BIA with the United States. 103 The impetus behind ASPA was
evident several years earlier when the Senate conducted hearings to discuss
whether supporting the newly formed ICC would be in the national interest of
the United States.104 During the hearings, Senator Jesse Helms, an outspoken
ICC critic, mentioned a number of concerns that he and others shared about the
Rome Statute.105 These concerns included the applicability of the Rome Statute
to citizens of nonparty states, the objectivity of an independent prosecutor who
appeared to be unaccountable to any government or institution, and the potential
for the ICC to question U.S. foreign policy decisions.106 During the hearings,
Senator Helms summarized his position on the ICC, noting that “[i]f other
nations are going to insist on placing Americans under the ICC’s jurisdiction
against their will, then Congress has a right and responsibility to place a cost
on their obstinacy, and to ensure our men and women in uniform are
protected.”107
To help alleviate these concerns, Senator Helms and others asked the
Secretary of State to meet a number of assurances before the United States
became a party to the Rome Statute.108 Senator Helms wanted assurance that:
(1) the United States would not provide assistance to the ICC or any
international organization that supports the ICC; (2) the United States would
not refer a case or extradite an individual to the ICC; (3) the United States
would prohibit its bilateral extradition treaty partners from extraditing a U.S.
citizen to the ICC; and (4) the United States would not allow any U.S. military
personnel to participate in international peacekeeping missions, including North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.N. operations, until all NATO
allies and the U.N. agree that the ICC cannot subject U.S. military personnel to
102. Scheffer, supra note 5, at 90.
103. ASPA, supra note 10.
104. National Interest Hearings, supra note 24.
105. Id.
106. M. Tia Johnson, The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act: Protecting Whom?,
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 441 (2003).
107. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen and Officials
from the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 106th Cong. 12 (2000) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman of Comm. on
Foreign Relations).
108. Johnson, supra note 106, at 441-42.
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its jurisdiction.109 These concerns are echoed in the findings portion of
ASPA.110
In addition to concerns over the welfare of U.S. military personnel, critics of
the Rome Statute also addressed the fear of politically motivated prosecutions
by the ICC.111 Some critics feared that U.S. leaders would become subject to
ICC prosecution based solely on controversial foreign policy decisions.112 This
fear was heightened by what ICC critics viewed as an unaccountable prosecutor
who could initiate prosecutions based solely on political motives.113 Section
2002 of ASPA addresses these concerns, noting that the Rome Statute “creates
a risk” that the ICC could subject the U.S. President and other senior officials
to prosecution for “such matters as responding to acts of terrorism, preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deterring aggression.”114
This section continues by stating, “No less than members of the Armed Forces
of the United States, senior officials of the United States Government should be
free from the risk of prosecution by the [ICC], especially with respect to official
actions taken by them to protect the national interests of the United States.”115
The U.S. delegation to the Rome Statute conferences expressed concerns
over ICC jurisdiction and the possibility of political prosecutions. Ultimately,
however, the United States was unsuccessful in its attempt to exempt U.S.
109. Id.
110. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2002. The relevant portions of this section read:
XX8. Members of the Armed Forces of the United States should be free from the
risk of prosecution by the [ICC], especially when they are stationed or deployed
around the world to protect the vital national interests of the United States. The
United States Government has an obligation to protect the members of its Armed
Forces, to the maximum extent possible, against criminal prosecutions carried
out by the [ICC].
XX. . . .
XX11. It is a fundamental principle of international law that a treaty is binding
upon its parties only and that it does not create obligations for nonparties without
their consent to be bound. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute
and will not be bound by any of its terms. The United States will not recognize
the jurisdiction of the [ICC] over United States nationals.
Id.
111. See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Regarding the ICC, supra note 80 (explaining that the
protections provided for in the Rome Statute are insufficient to meet U.S. concerns).
112. Id.
113. Id. (expressing concern that there are insufficient checks and balances on the authority
of the ICC prosecutor and judges because the Rome Statute creates a self-initiating prosecutor
who does not answer to any state or institution other than the ICC itself and noting that without
such an external check on the prosecutor, there is insufficient protection against politicized
prosecutions or other abuses).
114. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2002.
115. Id.
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personnel from ICC jurisdiction.116 By passing ASPA, Congress reacted
strongly to the possibility that U.S. citizens could be subject to ICC jurisdiction
under a treaty to which the United States was not a party.
Consistent with the U.S. interpretation of Article 98(2), ASPA contemplates
agreements that would exempt U.S. personnel from the jurisdiction of the
ICC.117 ASPA also prohibits U.S. courts, agencies, and entities of any state or
local government from cooperating with the ICC.118 Most significantly, ASPA
prohibits U.S. military assistance to states that are parties to the Rome
Statute.119 There are, however, three exceptions to this provision: (1) the U.S.
President can waive the prohibition if it is in the national interest;120 (2) the
prohibition does not apply if the state is a NATO member, a major non-NATO
ally, or Taiwan;121 and (3) the prohibition is not applicable to a state that “has
entered into an agreement with the United States pursuant to Article 98 of the
Rome Statute preventing the [ICC] from proceeding against [U.S.] personnel
present in such country.”122
ASPA was greeted with much criticism, both domestically and
internationally.123 Most notably, Scheffer voiced a number of criticisms about
ASPA at a meeting before the House International Relations Committee in July
2000.124 Scheffer argued strongly against ASPA, noting that:
[I]t is counter productive not only because of its direct impact on
critical negotiations relating to the [ICC], but also because [it]
would seriously damage U.S. national policy objectives. It would
hold national security and foreign policy interests hostage to the fate
of our relationship with governments that support the ICC . . . .125
Scheffer has also suggested that some ASPA provisions could unconstitutionally infringe on the president’s authority as commander-in-chief because they
116. See Keitner, supra note 92, at 238-63 (providing an analysis of the process behind the
drafting of Article 98(2) that focuses on U.S. proposals and reactions to them).
117. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2007.
118. Id. § 2004.
119. Id. § 2007.
120. Id. § 2007(b).
121. Id. § 2007(d).
122. Id. § 2007(c).
123. See, e.g., Roseann M. Latore, Escape Out the Back Door or Charge in the Front Door:
U.S. Reactions to the International Criminal Court, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 17275 (2002).
124. International Criminal Court: Part 2 — Recent Developments: Hearings Before the
House Int’l Relations Comm., 106th Cong. 87-91 (2000) [hereinafter House Committee
Hearings] (statement of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes).
125. Id. at 87.
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limit the United States’ ability to participate in certain military missions with
countries that have not signed a BIA with the United States.126
International criticism of ASPA did not focus on the constitutional dilemma
posed by the legislation, but rather on the apparent U.S. attempt to undermine
ICC jurisdiction.127 Some opponents pointed to ASPA as evidence of “a recent
trend toward unilateralism and non-cooperation by the United States
government.”128
E. Bilateral Immunity Agreements
As a number of commentators have pointed out, ASPA’s passage increases
the United States’ ability to persuade other countries to sign a BIA.129 Some
opponents of BIAs have gone even further by accusing the United States of
questionable negotiation tactics in its pursuit of these agreements.130
Despite international criticism of the BIAs, the United States contends that
these agreements are fully compatible with Article 98 of the Rome Statute.131
While some organizations may disagree with the U.S. position on the
compatibility of these agreements, the United States has been quite successful
in executing these BIAs in the wake of ASPA. As of December 2004, over
126. Id. at 88-89. Scheffer noted:
[T]he Department of Justice advises that these restrictions [in ASPA] on the
United States’ ability to participate in cooperative international activities . . .
may impair the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief, especially if such
actions are deemed by the President to be necessary to further operations in
which the United States armed forces are authorized to take part.
XXThe Department of Justice further advises that insofar as such a court can be
considered to be a type of international forum, the provision would seem to bar
the President from communicating with that forum . . . if such conduct were
considered “cooperation” with the forum. If so construed, it would present an
unconstitutional intrusion into the President’s plenary and exclusive authority
over diplomatic communications.
Id.
127. See England, supra note 5, at 965 (suggesting that ASPA “is an attempt to solidify
American opposition to the ICC and send a clear signal to other countries that are considering
ratification of the treaty”); see also Faulhaber, supra note 13, at 554-55 (noting that the United
States has used the threat of sanctions under ASPA to “encourage” other nations to sign BIAs,
which “allow the United States to oppose the [ICC] while still falling within the letter of the
Rome Statute”); Galbraith, supra note 43, at 693-95 (discussing the Bush administration’s
approach of “aggressive unilateralism” and its effect on the ICC).
128. Faulhaber, supra note 13, at 554.
129. Id. (discussing the “coercive nature” of ASPA).
130. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
131. Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Regarding the ICC, supra note 80 (asserting that the U.S. draft
BIA “is fully consistent with the Rome Statute. Article 98 of the Statute expressly
contemplates such agreements.”).
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ninety countries had signed a BIA with the United States.132 Over forty of these
countries are parties to the Rome Statute.133 The United States considers the
large number of BIAs it has signed with parties to the Rome Statute as evidence
of the appropriateness of these agreements.134 In a press statement announcing
the recent signing of two new BIAs by parties to the Rome Statute, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher noted that the signing “demonstrates
the recognition among States Parties to the [ICC] that Article 98 Agreements
are an important mechanism provided for in the ICC Treaty.”135
Currently, there are three types of BIAs. The first type provides that both
parties agree not to surrender each other’s nationals to the ICC without the
consent of the other party.136 Under the second type of BIA, the second state is
prohibited from handing over a U.S. national to the ICC, but the United States
may still surrender nationals of the second state to the ICC.137 For states that
have neither ratified nor signed the Rome Statute, the third type of BIA contains

132. ICC, Status of BIAs, supra note 14.
133. Id.
134. Press Statement, U.S. Dept. of State, Article 98 Agreements (Sept. 23, 2003), at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/24331.htm.
135. Id.
136. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16. An example of a typical BIA (of
the first type) reads, in part, as follows:
XX1. For purposes of this agreement, “persons” are current or former
government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or
nationals of one Party.
XX2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
the expressed consent of the first Party,
XX(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal
Court for any purpose, or
XX(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third
country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer
to the International Criminal Court.
XX3. When the United States extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a
person of the other Party to a third country, the United States will not agree to the
surrender or transfer of that person to the International Criminal Court by the
third country, absent the expressed consent of the government of [the other
Party].
XX4. When the government of [the other Party] extradites, surrenders, or
otherwise transfers a person of the United States of America to a third country,
the government of [the other Party] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person to the International Criminal Court by a third country, absent the
expressed consent of the government of the United States.
Murphy, supra note 13, at 201-02 (citing Agreement Regarding the Surrender of Persons to
the International Criminal Court, Aug. 23, 2002, U.S.-E. Timor).
137. Murphy, supra note 13, at 201-02.
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a provision “requiring those states not to cooperate with efforts of third states
to surrender persons to the [ICC].”138
III. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and General Principles
of Treaty Interpretation
A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The VCLT sets forth the rights and duties of those states that are signatories
or parties to international treaties.139 Under Article 18 of the VCLT, “[a] state
is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty” when that treaty has not yet entered into force, or when the state is a
signatory but not yet a party to that treaty.140 A primary question in the
controversy regarding the BIAs is whether a state that has entered into one of
these agreements with the United States can meet the obligations of the BIA
while still performing its required duties under the Rome Statute.141 Opponents
of the BIAs claim that entering into these agreements constitutes an act that
could cause a state to violate its duties to the ICC under the Rome Statute.142
To make such a judgment regarding the compatibility of the BIAs with the
Rome Statute, however, the object and purpose of the Rome Statute must first
be determined.
The principles of treaty interpretation are codified in Articles 31-33 of the
VCLT.143 Determining the object and purpose of a treaty is necessary to inform
the inquiry into the interpretation of its terms.144 Article 31 explains that a
treaty must “be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.”145
Even though the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms is paramount in a
treaty interpretation under the VCLT,146 courts are not limited to such a literal
reading. On the contrary, Article 31 requires a court looking at the ordinary
meaning of a treaty’s terms to interpret these terms “in their context” and “in

138. Id.
139. VCLT, supra note 18; see also Swaine, supra note 44, at 2066-71 (discussing the
relationship between signing a treaty and ratifying a treaty).
140. VCLT, supra note 18, art. 18.
141. See infra Part IV.B.3.
142. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
143. VCLT, supra note 18, arts. 31-33.
144. Id. art. 31(1).
145. Id.
146. See id.
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light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose.”147 In fact, the requirement in Article
31 that a treaty’s terms be interpreted in light of its object and purpose prevents
the “ordinary meaning” principle from becoming too constraining.148
For those situations in which Article 31 guidance may be insufficient to
provide a satisfactory treaty interpretation, Article 32 describes supplementary
means of interpretation.149 To confirm or to clarify an ambiguous or obscure
meaning of an Article 31 interpretation, the court may look to supplementary
material, such as “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion.”150
B. Determining the Object and Purpose of the Rome Statute
Of the eleven statements in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, three are
relevant to an attempt to construe the Statute’s object and purpose.151 These
read as follows:
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that
their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at
the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes, . . .
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established
under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions . . . .152
Even within the Preamble to the Rome Statute, the potential for conflict among
the goals of the ICC is evident. The conflict involves the principle of
complementarity153 and the determination to end the impunity of war criminals,
both of which are echoed in the Preamble.154 While the ICC demands that no
individual escape punishment, it also defers to domestic courts through
complementarity.155 Thus, a conflict could easily arise when, after initially
deferring to the jurisdiction of a suspect’s domestic legal system, the ICC later

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
See id.
Id. art. 32.
Id.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
Id.
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
Id.
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decides that the domestic legal system did not adequately handle the case.156 In
such a situation, the ICC’s deference to a domestic legal system would be
tested. The tension between these potentially competing goals within the ICC
does not, however, obstruct an attempt to ascertain the object and purpose of
the Rome Statute. To the contrary, the principle of complementarity in the
Rome Statute makes the object and purpose of the treaty more apparent.
The ICC’s purpose is not to prosecute every war criminal itself but rather to
ensure that every war criminal is prosecuted by some tribunal, whether it be the
ICC or a domestic court.157 If a suspect’s domestic legal system is able to
adequately investigate and prosecute a case, then the ICC will remain
uninvolved and defer to that legal system.158 If, however, the domestic legal
system is unable or unwilling to investigate a suspect, then the ICC will step in
to ensure that the individual does not enjoy impunity.159 Thus, the ICC’s goal
is to carry out the investigation, trial, and punishment itself only if the suspect’s
domestic legal system has failed in this regard.160
IV. A Case of Jurisdictional Conflict Between the United States and the
ICC
A. A Hypothetical Problem of State X: Arguments on the Issue of
Jurisdiction
Through the principle of complementarity, the United States hoped to avoid
any jurisdictional conflicts with the ICC.161 As the controversy surrounding the
BIAs demonstrates, the potential for conflict is nevertheless a reality and a
156. See infra Part V.
157. See Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16. The organization notes:
The overall object and purpose of the Rome Statute is to ensure that those
responsible for the worst possible crimes are brought to justice in all cases,
primarily by states, but, under the underlying principle of complementarity, if
they prove unable or unwilling to do so, by the International Criminal Court as
a last resort. Thus, any agreement not expressly provided for in the Rome Statute
that precludes the International Criminal Court from exercising its
complementary function of acting when states are unable or unwilling to do so,
defeats the object and purpose of the Statute.
Id. For a state to “defeat the object and purpose” of the Rome Statute, it would have to engage
in an act that would hinder a suspect’s prosecution by either the ICC or a domestic legal
system. See VCLT, supra note 18, art. 18; see also infra Part IV.B.3.
158. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20.
159. Id.
160. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 201 (noting that language in U.S. BIAs also asserts that
the Rome Statute “is intended to complement and not supplant national criminal jurisdiction”).
161. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of
complementarity).
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problem that the international community must address to ensure the ICC’s
effectiveness.
Consider the following hypothetical situation of State X, a state that is a
party to the Rome Statute and has signed a BIA with the United States. In the
event that a member of the U.S. military is captured in State X by authorities
of State X on the suspicion of committing a crime that falls within Article 5 of
the Rome Statute,162 the ICC could request State X to surrender that individual.
Assuming that the United States does not consent to the surrender of this
individual to the ICC, U.S. officials would likely point to the provisions of the
BIA that prohibit such a surrender by State X.163
In an attempt to gain greater international support for its position on
nonsurrender, the United States could also work within the principles of the
Rome Statute and point to the provisions that address the issue of
complementarity, namely the Preamble,164 Article 1,165 and Article 17.166
According to Article 17, the ICC should not assert jurisdiction over a case
where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute.167
In the hypothetical situation with State X, the United States could demonstrate
that it was investigating the conduct of the suspect and, if appropriate, would
prosecute the individual in the United States according to U.S. law.
Even if the United States conducted an investigation, the international
community or the ICC might still determine that the ICC could exercise
jurisdiction over the case. If a U.S. court ordered a punishment that other states
considered inadequate, or if the U.S. court found the suspect innocent, the Rome
162. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5.
163. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (noting that the BIA prohibits the
transfer of persons to the ICC for any purpose).
164. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (noting that “the [ICC] established under this
statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”).
165. Id. art. 1 (stating that the ICC “shall be a permanent institution and shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern . . . and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction
and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.”).
166. Id. art. 17.
167. Id.
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Statute still provides a mechanism for the ICC to assert jurisdiction over the
case.168 Article 20 operates to ensure that no suspect can enjoy impunity
through a staged or sham investigation or prosecution by allowing the ICC to
conduct a second investigation.169
In response to the hypothetical U.S. arguments discussed above, proponents
of the transfer of the suspect from State X to the ICC could point to the
provisions of the Rome Statute that support the exercise of ICC jurisdiction.
According to Article 86, “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions
of this Statute, cooperate fully with the [ICC] in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the [ICC].”170
More importantly, supporters of ICC jurisdiction would note that the ICC
alone can make the decision whether Article 98(2) bars State X from
surrendering the U.S. suspect.171 One recent legal opinion on this question
expressed a similar view, contending that if the issue of whether the ICC should
respect the terms of a BIA “arises in the context of a request for a person to be
transferred to the [ICC] . . . then it will likely be for the [ICC] to determine
whether the terms of the [BIA] are compatible with the [Rome] Statute.”172
The text of the Rome Statute also supports the claim that the ICC itself
would decide the issue of compatibility. Rule 195(1) of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence states, “When a requested State notifies the [ICC] that a request
for surrender or assistance raises a problem of execution in respect of article 98,
the requested State shall provide any information relevant to assist the [ICC] in
the application of article 98.”173 This provision confirms that the ICC, not the

168. See id. art. 20.
169. Id. One of the provisions in Article 20 reads:
XXNo person who has been tried by another court for [genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes] shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
XX(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
XX(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance
with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Id. art. 20(3).
170. Id. art. 86.
171. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
172. James Crawford SC, Philippe Sands QC & Ralph Wilde, In the Matter of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States
Under Article 98(2) of the Statute (June 16, 2003), at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
otherissues/impunityart98/SandsCrawfordBIA14June03.pdf [hereinafter BIAs Sought by U.S.].
173. INT’L CRIM. CT. R. 195.
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sending state or the receiving state, makes the ultimate decision regarding a
conflict between a BIA and the Rome Statute.
The granting of decision-making authority to the ICC is made more explicit
in Article 119(1) of the Rome Statute, which states, “Any dispute concerning
the judicial functions of the [ICC] shall be settled by the decision of the
[ICC].”174 The hypothetical conflict with State X and the United States would
constitute a “dispute” within the meaning of Article 119.175 The “judicial
function” of the ICC involved in the dispute would be the ICC’s request for the
surrender of the U.S. citizen from State X.176 The ICC has reserved the right
to make final decisions in situations where a state attempts to claim an Article
98 exemption for one of its nationals.177 While the ICC welcomes information
from that state to aid in its decision,178 the ICC will ultimately decide the
issue.179
If State X were to face the difficult decision of deciding whether to hand over
a U.S. national to the United States or to the ICC, each of the parties to the
controversy clearly would have strong arguments supporting its claim to
jurisdiction over the suspect. To summarize, the United States can point to the
principle of complementarity included in Article 17 of the Rome Statute and
insist that it is conducting an investigation, which precludes the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction.180 In contrast, the ICC can rely on Article 86, which
requires parties — in this example, State X — to cooperate fully with the ICC
in its investigation and prosecution of crimes.181 Furthermore, the ICC can
argue that it alone determines whether the terms of the BIA are compatible with
the Rome Statute.182
In resolving State X’s conflict, the ICC would likely have to examine the
BIA’s provisions to determine whether it hinders ICC jurisdiction. In other
words, if the ICC does not consider the BIA to be one of the “international
agreements” contemplated in Article 98(2),183 then Article 98(2) possibly would
not apply and the BIA with the United States would not entitle State X to
withhold assistance from the ICC. The ICC, therefore, must examine both the
BIA and the Rome Statute to determine whether Article 98(2) contemplates this
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
art. 17.
181.
182.
183.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(1).
See BIAs Sought by U.S., supra note 172.
See id.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(1).
INT’L CRIM. CT. R. 195.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(1).
See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1,
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
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type of agreement. In conducting this inquiry, the ICC should also consider the
BIA in relation to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.184 This
consideration will demonstrate whether, even if Article 98(2) contemplates
BIAs, the ICC should uphold them as consistent with the Rome Statute or
whether the ICC should effectively ignore them when asserting jurisdiction.
B. Analysis of the BIAs in Relation to the Rome Statute
To determine whether Article 98(2) contemplates BIAs, it is first necessary
to understand the effect BIAs could have on an attempt by the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over a suspect. A closer examination of the major provisions of a
typical BIA will aid in demonstrating how the agreement could affect an
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. Furthermore, this examination will also
address some of the major objections to the current form of the BIAs.
1. The Scope of the BIAs
The “persons” referred to in a BIA include “current or former government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals
of one Party.”185 A significant amount of the criticism surrounding BIAs has
centered around the broad use of the term “person.”186 Opponents of the BIAs
contend that the drafters of the Rome Statute intended Article 98(2) to include
only those persons who were traditionally covered under SOFAs.187 This view
would have the primary effect of limiting the scope of the Article 98(2)
exception to military personnel.188 The United States’ expansive use of the term
“person” in the BIAs would mean that a broader range of individuals could be
exempted from ICC jurisdiction. In addition to current military personnel,
former military personnel could be exempted from ICC jurisdiction under the
BIAs even if they were present in the state for nonmilitary or other personal
reasons.189
For those BIA opponents who argue that the Article 98(2) exception includes
only extradition treaties or SOFAs,190 the United States’ use of the term
“persons” results in a broader exception than that intended by the drafters of
Article 98. Most notably, the European Union was among the critics of the
184. See supra Part III.A-B.
185. Murphy, supra note 13, at 201.
186. See, e.g., Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
187. See Keitner, supra note 92, at 238-63 (providing an analysis of the process behind the
drafting of Article 98(2) that focuses on U.S. proposals and reactions to them).
188. SOFAs are intended to cover only those persons officially “sent” by a “sending state,”
which is typically limited to military or support personnel.
189. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
190. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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BIAs that objected to this broad use of “persons.”191 In September 2002, the
Council of the European Union issued a set of “Guiding Principles” to its
member states regarding the appropriateness of proposed BIAs with the United
States.192 The Council noted, “Entering into U.S. agreements — as presently
drafted — would be inconsistent with ICC States Parties’ obligations with
regard to the ICC Statute and may be inconsistent with other international
agreements to which ICC States Parties are Parties.”193 The Council indicated
that the scope of the persons covered by the BIAs was overly broad.194 In
addition to the other suggestions for changes that would make the BIAs more
compatible with the Rome Statute, the Council proposed that the agreements
“should cover only persons present on the territory of a requested State because
they have been sent by a sending State.”195
Other critics contend that the BIAs are therefore intended to “seek immunity
for a broad class of persons, without any reference to the traditional sending
state-receiving state relationship of SOFA . . . agreements.”196 Critics have
disapprovingly noted some of the possible results of broadly defining the term
“persons.” Under a BIA, a “person” could include “anyone found on the
territory of the state concluding the agreement with the [United States] who
works or has worked for the [U.S.] government.”197 According to this
interpretation, a BIA could be used to exempt anyone of any nationality from
ICC jurisdiction if that person has some relationship, however tenuous, with the
U.S. government. This broad definition could even exempt a citizen of the state
where that individual is found or in which the conduct occurs, which potentially
has the effect of “preventing that state from taking responsibility for its own
citizens.”198 For example, according to this interpretation, if a citizen of Canada
works for the U.S. government in Canada, the United States could use a BIA
with Canada to claim jurisdiction over that individual, even against the wishes
of Canadian authorities. Other critics point out that the persons covered under
the BIAs could include “persons travelling through, conducting personal
business or vacationing in the USA or the second state.”199
191. General Affairs and External Relations, COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, 2450th Sess.,
Doc. No. 12516/02 (Sept. 30, 2002).
192. Id. at 9-10.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id. at 11.
195. Id.
196. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, U.S. Bilateral Immunity or So-Called
“Article 98” Agreements, at http://iccnow.org/pressroom/factsheets/FS-BIAsAug2004.pdf (last
updated Aug. 16, 2004).
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id. at 3.
199. Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
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By insisting on a broad use of the term “persons,” the United States
inadvertently supports those who argue that Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute
was intended only to cover agreements such as extradition treaties or SOFAs
and not broader agreements such as the BIAs. The U.S. contention that the
BIAs are consistent with Article 98(2) might be stronger were the scope of the
agreements narrower. In their current form, however, the broad scope of the
exceptions in the BIAs appears to exceed those intended under Article 98(2).200
Although Article 98(2) uses the traditional SOFA language and refers to the
“sending state,”201 the U.S. BIA does not defer to the traditional SOFA
classifications intended by the drafters of Article 98(2).202 A number of critics
agree that the broader scope of the U.S. agreements effectively removes them
from the exceptions under Article 98(2).203

200.
201.
202.
203.

See supra notes 190-99.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).
See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
Critics argue that the U.S. BIA definition of “persons”
covers a considerably broader class of persons than those who can properly be
characterised as having been “sent” by a State. “Employees” may have been
locally engaged; “former Government officials” and “nationals” may be resident
in the requested State or visiting in a private capacity, e.g. for the purposes of
business or tourism. In this way the agreements being sought by the [United
States] go well beyond the scope of the agreements envisaged by Article 98(2).
BIAs Sought by U.S., supra note 172.
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2. Lack of a Guarantee of U.S. Investigation or Prosecution in the BIAs
In addition to the broader scope of the persons covered by the BIAs, there is
another weakness in the U.S. argument that Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute
contemplates the BIAs. Under a typical BIA, a state agrees that they will not
turn over a suspect to the ICC without the consent of the United States.204
Nevertheless, no guarantee exists that the United States will conduct an
investigation into the occurrence once the suspect is turned over to the United
States. This lack of a guaranteed investigation could potentially result in a
situation in which the United States would claim jurisdiction over a suspect in
accordance with a BIA, but would then refuse to conduct an investigation or,
if appropriate, a prosecution.
This lack of a guaranteed investigation also strengthens critics’ contentions
that the primary motivation behind the U.S. BIAs was to ensure immunity for
U.S. citizens.205 If the United States had included some guarantee of
investigation once the suspect is handed over to U.S. authorities, perhaps the
critics of the BIAs would have to concede that the suspect would still face
investigation by the United States. In their current form, however, the BIAs do
not provide this assurance. To the contrary, the agreements are silent regarding
the procedures facing the suspects once they are under U.S. jurisdiction.
The Council of the European Union also noted this weakness in the U.S.
position. It recommended that any immunity agreement proposed by the United
States “should include appropriate operative provisions ensuring that persons
who have committed crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the [ICC] do not
enjoy impunity. Such provisions should ensure appropriate investigation and
— where there is sufficient evidence — prosecution by national jurisdictions
concerning persons requested by the ICC.”206
3. Inconsistency of a State’s Obligations Under a BIA with Its
Obligations Under the Rome Statute
As demonstrated above, a state that is a party to both a BIA and the Rome
Statute could face conflicting obligations when both the United States and the
ICC claim jurisdiction over a suspect presently in that state.207 If both the
United States and the ICC claimed jurisdiction over a suspect, the United States
would likely point to the BIA and argue that because Article 98(2) contemplated
this agreement, the BIA should be honored by allowing the United States to
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, supra note 191, at 10.
See supra Part IV.
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assert jurisdiction over the suspect. As noted in the discussion above, however,
Article 98(2) does not contemplate the BIAs.208 The expanded scope of
“persons” included in the BIAs and the lack of any effective guarantee of
prosecution or investigation support the critics’ arguments that these
agreements are drastically different than the more limited SOFAs the drafters
intended under Article 98(2).209
Even if the U.S. position that the BIAs are consistent with Article 98(2) is
correct, the larger and more important issue of whether the BIAs are consistent
with the Rome Statute must still be considered. For instance, in the
hypothetical conflict discussed above, if State X decided to turn over the
suspect to the jurisdiction of the United States in accordance with the BIA, there
is no guarantee that the United States would conduct an investigation.210
This situation presents three primary challenges to a state’s obligations under
the Rome Statute. First, the primary purpose of the Rome Statute is to ensure
that no suspect enjoys impunity.211 If State X turns over the suspect to the
United States in accordance with a BIA and the United States does not conduct
an investigation, this purpose of the Rome Statute has been defeated because
that suspect could enjoy impunity. Critics of the BIAs have emphasized this
impunity argument repeatedly in their campaign against BIAs.212 For example,
according to one legal opinion, a state that enters into a BIA that makes it
possible to immunize a suspect from ICC jurisdiction does not uphold the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute: “[I]t would not be compatible with that State
Party’s obligations under the ICC Statute, both to other State Parties and to the
[ICC]. It may also be incompatible with the general duty under international
law and specific treaties to investigate and, if warranted, to prosecute
international crimes.”213
Second, a state’s attempt to fulfill its obligations under a BIA could also
conflict with the principle of complementarity established in the Rome
Statute.214 Under this principle, the ICC is obligated to defer to a state’s
domestic judicial system when that state is willing and able to perform the
investigation.215 The principle of complementarity works in conjunction with
the purpose of avoiding impunity because exceptions to ICC jurisdiction are
made only when the ICC is satisfied that a suspect will not escape
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra Parts IV.B.1-2.
See supra notes 187-99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A-B.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16.
BIAs Sought by U.S., supra note 172.
See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20.
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investigation.216 Article 17 of the Rome Statute sets forth some of these
exceptions, such as a situation in which a state’s domestic legal system is
willing and able to conduct an investigation.217 Article 98(2) also provides the
exceptions for extradition treaties and SOFAs.218 In addition to the Article 17
exceptions to ICC jurisdiction, these Article 98(2) exceptions are also designed
to include mechanisms for ensuring that a state will investigate and, if
appropriate, prosecute a suspect.219
Although the United States claims that the BIAs fall under the Article 98(2)
exceptions,220 the lack of a guaranteed investigation of the suspect significantly
weakens this claim. Through the BIAs, the United States attempts to
circumvent the principle of complementarity: although it claims an exception
under Article 98(2), it subsequently refuses to guarantee an investigation of the
suspect exempted from ICC jurisdiction.221
The exceptions made in the Rome Statute for ICC jurisdiction under the
complementarity principle presume that an investigation will still be carried out,
even if not by the ICC. This idea is also echoed in Article 20 of the Rome
Statute, which allows the ICC to investigate a suspect after a state’s
investigation if the state proceedings “[w]ere for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction
of the [ICC]” or were otherwise “not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and
were conducted in a manner which . . . was inconsistent with an intent to bring
the person concerned to justice.”222 Thus, under Article 20, even if a domestic
legal system has conducted an investigation, the ICC still has authority to
ensure that the state conducted the investigation in a manner consistent with the
Rome Statute.223 Because no assurance of investigation exists under U.S. BIAs,
a state honors its obligations to the United States under a BIA at the expense of
its obligations to the ICC, which could result in the state acting contrary to the
principle of complementarity that is enshrined in the Rome Statute.224
A third and final area of conflict involves the duty of parties to the Rome
Statute to “cooperate fully with the [ICC] in its investigation and prosecution

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

BIAs Sought by U.S., supra note 172.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
Id. art. 98(2).
Id.
See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
See Amnesty International, U.S. Efforts, supra note 16.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20.
Id.
See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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of crimes” within its jurisdiction.225 This duty of cooperation is also reflected
in Articles 86, 87, 89, and 90 of the Rome Statute, which provide the general
provisions for requests for cooperation and describe the mechanisms for
surrendering suspects to the jurisdiction of the ICC.226 A state party that
refuses to surrender a suspect to the ICC and instead turns that suspect over to
the United States in accordance with a BIA contravenes not only the principle
of complementarity but also the duty of cooperation articulated within the Rome
Statute.227
Regarding the issue of cooperation, supporters of the BIAs point to Article
98(2), arguing that the state party does not have a duty to cooperate with the
ICC when this type of conflict occurs, primarily because the ICC may not
request a surrender when that request would require a state party “to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements.”228 Once
again, this line of argument leads to the discussion of whether the BIAs are
considered one of the types of “international agreements” contemplated under
Article 98(2).229 As noted in the discussion above, the drafters of Article 98(2)
did not intend to provide an exception to jurisdiction as broad as the one
included in the current form of the BIAs.230 Because Article 98(2) does not
include the BIAs, the duty to cooperate with the ICC remains intact. When a
conflict arises, a state cannot rely on its obligations under a BIA to justify its
refusal to cooperate with an ICC request for jurisdiction over a suspect.
V. International Consequences of the U.S. Campaign to Secure BIAs
For those states that are parties to the Rome Statute but do not sign a BIA
with the United States, severe consequences can result under ASPA. Most
significantly, these consequences can include a prohibition of U.S. military
assistance.231 Unless the state is a NATO member, a major non-NATO ally, or
Taiwan, the only way for that state to be assured that it will continue to receive
U.S. military assistance is to sign a BIA.232 ASPA does, however, provide for
one additional exception to the military assistance prohibition — the U.S.
President may waive the prohibition when it is in the U.S. national interest.233
Although these waivers should allow a party to the Rome Statute to continue to
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.
See id. arts. 86-87, 89-90.
Id. art. 86.
Id. art. 98(2).
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
ASPA, supra note 10, § 2007.
Id.
Id.
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receive U.S. military aid, President Bush’s refusal to grant these exemptions has
led to a combined loss of $40.53 million in military aid for twenty-two countries
in fiscal year 2004.234
The U.S. prohibition on providing military aid to those parties to the Rome
Statute that choose not to sign a BIA has harmed U.S. foreign policy interests.
Scheffer warned of the potential for harm to U.S. foreign policy interests under
ASPA in his July 2000 address to the House International Relations
Committee.235 Scheffer argued that ASPA was counterproductive “not only
because of its direct impact on critical negotiations relating to the [ICC], but
also because [it] would seriously damage U.S. national policy objectives.”236
Scheffer characterized ASPA as something that “ties the President’s hands in
a way that can severely undermine this nation’s ability and will to protect our
national interests.”237
In the four years since his testimony to the House International Relations
Committee, some of Scheffer’s fears about ASPA have been realized. One
notable area of conflict with U.S. national interests occurred in relation to
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Some of the countries that heeded the U.S. call for
troops, including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovakia, had their
military funding suspended by the United States for their refusal to sign a
BIA.238 For example, Bulgaria lost $1.2 million in aid from the United States,
even though it had allowed U.S. planes to use one of its air bases on the way to
Iraq.239 Lithuania, which had sent troops to Iraq, lost $4 million in U.S. aid.240
Estonia faced $2.75 million in suspended aid, even though it had also sent
troops to Iraq.241 One critic characterized the U.S. treatment of these European
states as “a slap in the face.”242
ASPA restrictions on military assistance have also affected U.S. efforts to
control the international drug trade. As a result of these restrictions, the United
States suspended military aid to twelve countries in Latin America, all of whom
234. The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International
Criminal Court, Chronology of U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court, at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/UStimeline.pdf (last modified Oct. 2003).
235. House Committee Hearings, supra note 124.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. World Federalist Ass’n, Sanctioning Allies: Effects of the “Article 98" Campaign
(
D
e
c
.
2
0
0
3
)
,
a
t
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/impunityart98/WICC_BIASanctions
24Nov03.pdf [hereinafter Sanctioning Allies].
239. Jackson Diehl, Allies and Ideology, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2003, at A21.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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had cooperated with the United States in the war on drugs.243 These countries
included Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.244
Perhaps the most significant effect of the ASPA restrictions and the Bush
administration’s refusal to provide more waivers has been a backlash in public
opinion against the United States. In a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell urging the United States to provide more waivers to U.S. allies, Human
Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth noted that the United States’
worldwide campaign to execute BIAs has engendered “enormous
resentment.”245 Roth also pointed out that many of the states that signed a BIA
with the United States did so only as a result of threats and coercion:
Officials from a number of governments have stated publicly that
they believe the [BIAs] violate their international treaty obligations,
their domestic laws and in some cases even their constitutions.
Several states have signed agreements only in the face of what their
diplomats have labeled “unbearable” pressure, including threats to
cut not only military aid, but humanitarian aid, and economic
assistance as well.246
Although the Bush administration may contend that the campaign to secure
BIAs has been a success, the “price” of these agreements has caused great
damage to U.S. credibility worldwide.247
The Bush administration appears to have taken some of these criticisms into
consideration. In November 2003, President Bush signed a waiver that partially
lifted the military aid restrictions on Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Bulgaria.248 The significance of the waiver should not be
overstated, given that it does not signify a retreat from the general opposition
of the Bush administration to the ICC. Instead, President Bush granted only a
partial waiver for states that were directly involved in military actions closely
linked to U.S. interests.249 Furthermore, there was a significant amount of
bipartisan support for the waiver in Congress, which possibly sent a message
243. Sanctioning Allies, supra note 238.
244. Id.
245. Human Rights Watch, Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights
Watch, to Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 9, 2003), at http://www.iccnow.org/
pressroom/membermediastatements/2003/HRWPowellLetterICC1209031.pdf [hereinafter Kenneth
Roth Letter].
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Diehl, supra note 239. This waiver is a partial waiver because it only covers funds
used in relation to NATO, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom, which
is the military action in Afghanistan.
249. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005

132

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:97

to President Bush that “[e]ven for the mainstream of the Republican Party,
Bush’s heedless erosion of American alliances has become a serious
concern.”250 These waivers could indicate that while the Bush administration
remains opposed to the ICC, members within the administration are nevertheless
receptive to political pressure from Congress on the issue.251
To ameliorate some of the damage caused by the BIA campaign to the
international opinion of the United States and the United States’ ability to
effectively pursue its national interests, the Bush administration should consider
providing more “national interest” waivers252 to states that are parties to the
ICC but have not signed a BIA with the United States.253 Like the waivers
granted to the European nations, this course of action would signify not only
that the United States recognizes the damaging effects of the BIA campaign, but
also that the United States is willing to look at options other than a prohibition
on military aid when dealing with states that are parties to the Rome Statute.
VI. Conclusion
Even if U.S. fears about possible uses or abuses of ICC jurisdiction are not
unfounded, the BIA provision contained in ASPA represents an excessive and
potentially abusive reaction to those fears. Instead of merely voicing its
opposition to the ICC, the United States is using the BIAs to discourage other
countries from demonstrating their support for the ICC.254 For those states that
are already parties to the Rome Statute, U.S. pressure could have the added
250. Id. Diehl reports:
XXBush’s delivery of the exemptions . . . seems to have been precipitated in part
by a congressional rebellion. A measure to exempt the six countries from the
military aid cutoff passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously
earlier [in November 2003], under the bipartisan sponsorship of Democrats
Joseph Biden and Richard Durbin and Republicans Gordon Smith and Lisa
Murkowski. In the House, a similar measure was sponsored by Republican John
Shimkus of Illinois.
Id.
251. Id.
252. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2007.
253. See Kenneth Roth Letter, supra note 245. Roth writes:
XXThe course the [Bush] administration has pursued comes with an extremely
high price tag, including weakening the principle of the equal application of the
law and respect for multilateral institutions. Moreover, it has been damaging to
U.S. credibility worldwide. Now is the time to step back from an extremely
costly approach and ‘cut your losses.’ We urge you to reconsider the campaign
against the ICC and certainly to extend national interest waivers to all ICC states
parties that have not signed a [BIA].
Id.
254. See supra notes 129-30, 231-44 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/6

2005]

COMMENTS

133

result of effectively forcing those states to violate their obligations to the
international community under the treaty.255 Unsurprisingly, this pressure has
caused a significant amount of international criticism of the United States.
If the United States continues to oppose the ICC, it should do so in a way
that allows other states, particularly parties to the Rome Statute, to support the
new court without fear of economic consequences. The United States could do
this, and in fact already has done this with certain European allies,256 by using
the “national interest” waiver provision of ASPA.257 A continuation and
expansion of the waiver policy could alleviate some of the international tensions
surrounding the BIAs. Even if the United States does not expand its waiver
policy and instead insists on pursuing and enforcing the BIAs, it would still be
possible to reduce some of the international backlash that this campaign has
caused. By redrafting the BIAs to make them more compatible with the Rome
Statute,258 the United States could acknowledge some of the concerns of its
international critics while simultaneously demonstrating its resolve to maintain
its opposition to the ICC.
From its inception, the ICC has commanded a great deal of international
support.259 If the ICC successfully handles one or two high-profile cases in the
future, the reputation and acceptance of the ICC could increase dramatically.
The international community could begin to view the ICC as the authoritative
source for international justice. Should this occur, the United States would find
itself in the awkward position of actively opposing a court whose authority the
rest of the world accepts. In evaluating their policy toward the ICC, U.S.
leaders need to consider the potential inconsistency of asserting the authority of
the United States as a world leader while at the same time opposing a court that
a large portion of the international community supports.
Eric M. Meyer

255. See supra Part IV.B.3.
256. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
257. ASPA, supra note 10, § 2007(b).
258. For a discussion of two major areas of potential conflict between the BIAs and the
Rome Statute, see supra Parts IV.B.1-2.
259. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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